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Abstract
Mainstream literature on long-term performance of initial public offerings focuses on long-term
underperformance. Because underperformance is an anomalous phenomenon, many authors search
for explanations based on financial market imperfections. More recently, however, the attention
shifts from underperformance to long-term performance in general. This induces the search for
other than financial  market imperfections in explaining under- or  outperformance. This article
presents the idea that in many companies the preparation for the IPO and the IPO itself may bring
organizational change. It searches for IPO-related organizational change in The Netherlands with
interviews of Dutch corporate officers. The research shows that an IPO primarily changes financial
management and financial reporting, but that other types of organizational change may also be
relevant. Moreover, long-term stock  market performance was on average higher in companies
where IPO-related organizational changes were reported than in companies where the changes
were not reported.
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1.  Introduction
Companies that go public are faced with several costs and revenues [see e.g. Pagano and
Röell, 1998; Pagano, Panetta and  Zingales, 1998;  Goergen, 1998]. Owners that list a
company at a stock exchange thus consider the revenues to be larger than the costs. The
shareholders that stay with the company after the IPO and the new shareholders, however,
do not necessarily profit from the listing. Much empirical literature on initial public
offerings (IPOs) that addresses the long-term performance of IPOs suggests that these
stockholders may not profit from the IPO because the IPO companies show
underperformance. This market anomaly means that on average the returns at the stock
exchange of IPOs are smaller than those of comparable companies in a period of three to
five years after the IPO [Ritter, 1991; Loughran and  Ritter, 1995]. This result is even
independent of any pattern of prior shares trading performed by company executives
[Lee, 1997].
Several explanations arise for this anomalous phenomenon. Ritter [1991, 1997]
suggests various reasons for  underperformance. Issuer's timing, risk  mismeasurement,
fads as well as the fact that mainly optimistic investors will be prepared to buy overpriced
new IPO stock may all contribute to long term underperformance. Welch [1989, 1996]
proposes that low quality (underperforming) companies cannot mimic the signals of high
quality companies of which the owners issue IPO-shares at a discount and then wait
patiently before selling the remainder of the firm in a seasoned equity offering. Hughes
and Thakor [1992] suggest that long-term  underperformance originates from potential
legal liabilities of misrepresenting the quality of the IPO-shares. Carter, Dark and Singh
[1998] attribute lower performance to lower underwriter’s quality.  Teoh, Welch and
Wong [1998], finally, explain  underperformance from window dressing before the
company goes public.
Mainstream literature thus seems to focus on underperformance. However, some
authors do not find underperformance with initial public offerings [Brav and  Gompers,
1997], while there are companies even that show long-term outperformance (e.g. some2
software and  internet related companies). Moreover, in emerging South-East Asian
markets like Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and China underperformance seems to be an
exception [Kim,  Krinsky and Lee, 1995; Lee, Taylor and Walter, 1996;  Paudyal,
Saadouni and Briston, 1998; Mok and Hui, 1998]. Recently even outperformance comes
to the fore in the literature. Rajan and Servaes [1997], for example, find that there is an
inverse relation between analysts’ long-term growth forecasts and long-run performance,
whereas Krigman, Shaw and Womack [1999] predict under- and outperformance from
the first day market reaction. Finally, Jog and  McConomy [1999] find for IPOs at the
Toronto Stock Exchange that low(!) retained ownership, executive compensation plans, a
long operating history and the use of a large audit firm generate outperformance. This
relatively recent research does not focus on underperformance and therefore it may be
worthwhile to study the reasons for long-term performance in general.
The reviewed literature on long-term (under)performance suggest that firm
characteristics or attributes around the IPO date may be relevant for future performance.
However, no connection is made between long-term performance and the IPO-process
within the company itself. This seems to be an omission, as an IPO introduces new
groups of advisors and stakeholders to the company. These new groups like investment
banks, investment analysts and (institutional) investors will scrutinize the enterprise and
the owners and managers of IPO-companies can be assumed to react to this and to
anticipate on the new environment.
In this article we therefore search whether IPO-related changes exist, and -if they
exist- what type of changes are relevant. We searched IPO-related changes by asking
corporate officers in The Netherlands to fill in a questionnaire. Their responses to the
questionnaire indicate what qualitative organizational change was brought about by the
preparation for the IPO and/or the listing of the company at the stock exchange. We then
calculated the long-term performance of the individual companies from our sample and
we studied whether IPO-based changes are related to long-term performance.
Section 2 presents the theory on IPO-related changes. Section 3 goes into the data
and the methodology used. Section 4 shows the results from the questionnaires. Section 5
relates the questionnaire responses to the long-term performance measures used. Section
6 gives the summary and the conclusions.3
2. IPO-related changes
In this article we take the stance that an IPO will create changes within a company. There
are several reasons for this. First, IPO-shareholders are not only cashing in or aiming at
an improved liquidity for their stock. Though some shareholders may prefer to sell their
stock holdings completely at an IPO, very often a company goes public with the will also
to foster performance. Primarily an increase in solvency, the need to  finance  capital
projects more easily and the creation of liquid funds for eventualities and take-overs is
often mentioned in these situations [see e.g. Jaffeux, 1992].
Second, investment bankers and others may advise management on improving
performance, while more qualified (and costly) advisors are often attracted for the
preparation of the IPO. These experienced outsiders may really increase the knowledge of
the management. They scrutinize the strategies as well as the management itself. Such a
quality impulse will benefit company performance. The fact that a higher reputation of
investment bankers not only reduces  underpricing but also diminishes long-term
underperformance [Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998] is indicative for this.
Third, an IPO introduces new groups of investor related stakeholders (like
investment analysts and managers of mutual funds and pension funds) to the company.
These new groups will minutely examine the results and the performance (of the officers
of) the company. In order to fulfill the demands of these new groups companies may try
to improve the quality of (financial) information and to speed up the information
processing internally, while investor relations become relevant.
Finally, stock exchanges require companies to agree with a listing code and they
have to sign a listing contract. In particular an equal distribution of relevant (financial)
information among all investors becomes very important and information cannot be
provided to insiders without also informing outside investors. This means that companies
may have to reconsider their public relations and information policy.
Though not all of these changes ameliorate performance automatically, the
potential for IPO-related improvements exists. This potential may be valued as a real4
option at the IPO-date. It is not certain that the option will get “in the money” later, but
after some time investors will learn which companies adapt adequately to the new capital
market environment. If the potential for IPO-related improvements is not tapped, the
companies become long-term  underperformers. On the other hand, when companies
harvest the IPO-potential the option comes “in the money” and in this case the companies
will outperform the market.
With respect to this basic idea two remarks can be made. First, this approach is
partly related to Welch [1989, 1996], who also assumes that investors will learn the true
quality of the company during the first years at the stock exchange. Welch, however, uses
investor learning in order to explain the  underpricing phenomenon of an IPO in an
asymmetric information setting with fixed company quality. In his paper only high
quality companies can create shareholder value by affording itself the investment costs of
underpricing the IPO. In our framework we do not assume that quality is fixed in
advance, but that it may be improved by the IPO-process itself for the reasons mentioned
above. Our research, moreover, does not focus on  underpricing, but on the types of
quality changes generated by the IPO and whether these can explain long-term
performance. A second remark is that the IPO-related changes do not necessarily follow
an IPO chronologically in time. In fact, quite some changes will be brought about by the
preparation for the IPO, but whether these changes are improvements that create long-
term investors' value can only be considered some time after the IPO.
3. Data and methodology
This section presents the companies of which the officers were interviewed, the data used
as well as the methodology of retrieving the qualitative and quantitative results. It should
be noted that IPO-related changes are not necessarily financial in nature. Innovations,
improved marketing, better financial management, enhanced communications, and a
modernized human resource management may all contribute to the long-term
performance of a company after an IPO. Financial statements do not directly capture
these aspects and may be of minor use as a source of data on organizational change. For5
this reason we used questionnaires for studying the organizational IPO-related changes
within a company.
The questionnaire was presented to officers of Dutch companies that issued
public shares for the first time in the period 1987-1997. We only approached officers of
IPO-companies of which the headquarters during the interview period existed in The
Netherlands. We excluded companies that were created from mergers and stock-splits.
This left us with 53 companies to study. For these companies we approached executive
officers from the board of directors and officers from the (distinctive) board of
supervisors.
Officers of 27 companies wanted to cooperate. Most of the time the interviewee
was the CEO. The relatively high response rate of 51% can partly be explained from the
fact that we were prepared to visit the respondents in order to present our questionnaire in
the form of an interview. This procedure also gave us the certainty that the questionnaire
was answered by the corporate officer him/herself.
The characteristics of the companies of which officers were interviewed can be
compared to the companies of which no interview was granted. The results of these
comparisons are presented in tables 1 and 2.
Table 1 The number of companies both in and out of the sample (classified




<100 100=<Value<200 >=200 Total
In sample 14 6 7 27
Not in sample 14 4 8 26
Total 28 10 15 53
a  one DFL is now valued at 0.45378 EURO.6
Table 2 The number of companies both in and out of the sample (classified
according to the period of the IPO)
Year of IPO   1987-1989 1990-1993 1994-1997 Total
In sample 10 5 12 27
Not in sample 8 6 12 26
Total 18 11 24 53
Table 1 indicates that more than 50% of the  IPOs involved values smaller than 100
million DFL in the period 1987-1997. The number of companies within the sample does
not differ much from the number of companies out of the sample if IPO-value is
considered. Table 2 indicates whether the sampled companies are representative for all
companies when classified according to the sub-periods. We distinguished between two
"hot issue" periods and one "cold" period [Ibbotson and  Jaffe, 1975]. The period 1987-
1989 as well as the period of 1994-1997 are relatively "hot market" periods. The number
of companies within the sample in the various periods again does not differ largely from
the number of companies out of the sample. From Tables 1 and 2 we conclude that the
sample does give an adequate description of the Dutch IPO-market and that it is
representative for the period studied.
Interviewing  corporate officers on the changes caused by the IPO gives some
methodological difficulties. First, interviewing one officer does not give a complete
picture of the true situation of the company. Though that individual officer's perceptions
on changes will come to the fore, it is not necessarily the perception of all  corporate
officers. Though at some companies more interviews were held, we decided to take into
account here the answers given by only one officer. When we had a choice, we preferred
executive officers but only if that person had knowledge on both the situations before and
after the IPO.
Second, the interviews were held from October 1997 until March 1999. The first
IPOs of the sample studied then had thus been listed at the stock exchange already for
more than 10 years. Officers of the early listed companies were not all available for
various reasons, but according to Table 2 this did not create an absence bias in the7
sample. When the relevant officers were traced, the interviewees often mentioned that it
might be difficult to distinguish between changes caused by the IPO and other
concomitant changes. Nevertheless, all officers interviewed vividly remembered the IPO:
for the officers it is normally a "once during a life-time" event. On the other hand, the
officers of companies that received a listing more recently sometimes indicated that not
all IPO-related changes could already be recognized. Because we stressed with both
groups to take into account only IPO-related changes, we are confident to have at least a
best ‘guestimate’ of these changes.
In calculating the long-term performance of the shares of the IPO companies we
were confronted with the problem that a relatively small number of companies is listed at
the Dutch (Amsterdam) stock exchange. This makes it impossible to find comparable
listed companies. For this reason we decided to analyze under- and outperformance in
another way. We estimated the parameters of the following (market) model:
rit = ai + bi.rmt + eit (1)
where: rit  = the percentage daily return of IPO company i at time t;
rmt = the percentage daily return of the stock market index at time t;
ai  = the autonomous growth component of company i;
bi  = the beta of company i;
eit = the stochastic residual of company i at time t
The value of bi represents the company beta and the constant term of equation 1 ( ai)
represents the autonomous daily growth independent of the development of the stock
market index. If that constant term was positive we considered IPO company  i to show
outperformance, while a negative ai implied underperformance. Performance measured in
this way does not eliminate any survivor bias in the sample, but it has the advantage to
make the performance measurement independent of such bias. This performance
evaluation procedure,  moreover,  makes the  results independent of the choice of the8
benchmark that, according to Ritter [1991],  may alter the outcomes. The market model
procedure implies that for normal (average) performing companies only the beta and the
market returns determine the results. Companies with an equal beta that show higher or
lower autonomous growth than might be expected from its beta and the development of
the market index are, however,  considered  to  be different  from average companies in
other aspects. By comparing the IPO-related changes of company i with that company’s
ai-measure on long-term performance we hope to gain knowledge on these other aspects.
4. Results of the questionnaires
At the end of our qualitative questionnaire we asked with closed questions whether the
IPO created qualitative changes within the company. Table 3 presents the relevant
qualitative organizational aspects as well whether the aspect increased according to the
corporate officers. Table 3 also shows that only four qualitative organizational aspects did
change because of the IPO according to at least 50% of the respondents. Three of these
IPO-related changes are concentrated in the field of financial management: ‘effectiveness
and efficiency’, ‘planning and control of company results’ and ‘carefulness of  capital
budgeting’. Moreover, the fourth aspect of ‘openness of internal communications’ reflects
according to the officers' responses on the open questions the reporting with respect to
financial variables and company performance. Because it is of paramount importance to
distribute information on company performance evenly and in due time to the financial
market, it is not amazing that three corporate officers even considered that the ‘openness
of internal communications’ diminished. We therefore may conclude that IPO-related
changes with respect to financial management and financial reporting are considered of
highest relevance to the officers interviewed.9
Table 3 The number of companies in which the aspect after the IPO was increased,
unchanged or decreased according to the interviewed corporate officers
Increased Unchanged Decreased
Innovation 5 19 0
Client orientation 10 14 0
Alertness in the market 9 14 0
Effectiveness and efficiency 13 12 0
Planning and control of company results 17 7 1
Carefulness in capital budgeting 13 11 0
Clarity on what is relevant for settling  9 16 0
Achievement- and task-oriented leadership 11 14 0
Openness of internal communications 11 10 3
Decentralized decisions 5 18 1
Some reasons can be suggested for the relevance of financial management. First, officers
in a company are accustomed to use the financial language for communication. For this
reason the interviewees may be biased to financial aspects. Second, officers may attribute
the listing at the stock exchange as a period in which financial aspects come more
extensively to the fore. Both the financing of the company as well as the investment by
shareholders can be considered to induce a financial connotation and it is in line with the
fact that  IPOs are mainly studied by financial scholars. Third, though "innovation",
"client orientation" and "alertness in the  market" etc. are relevant for evaluating a
company, these aspects may already have been vested within many companies before its
shares are issued publicly and most company officers would then not mention these types
of IPO-related changes.10
5. IPO-related changes and performance
In estimating the market model (equation 1) we used dividend reinvested daily returns for
the IPO companies as well as the dividend reinvested market index of the Central Bureau
of Statistics in  The Netherlands. All data were retrieved from  Datastream®. We then
estimated the market model for the newly listed companies during a maximum period of
three years after the moment of listing with linear regression. For all calculations we used
procedures from SPSS. We both measured the impact of the whole period of three years
after introduction as well as that same period without the first five days in order to reduce
the potential effect of underpricing. Both estimates showed minor differences in the
magnitude and no different signs of ai of the market equation. We therefore excluded the
first five trading days in order to focus in particular on long-run performance. In table 4
we present a summary of the results of the coefficients ( ai and  bi) found from the
regression analyses,
Table 4 Results of estimates of the  market model for 27  IPOs in  The
Netherlands in the period 1987-1997
Estimate of Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum # positive
ai 0.058 0.083 -0.093 0.228 19
bi 0.585 0.334 0.124 1.511 27
ai indicates the estimated autonomous average daily percentage returns of company  i
during a maximum period of not more than 777 trading days one week after the
introduction of the stock at the stock exchange. bi indicates the estimated beta of company
i according to market equation (1).
Table 4 indicates that the abnormal daily average return for all the IPOs investigated is
small (0.058%) but significantly positive: with a  one sample t-value of 3.655 it is
significantly different from zero at the 0.001 level. The implied outperformance may be
caused by the fact that we did not approach officers of one bankrupt company. It may,11
however, also be a characteristic of the long-term performance of the Dutch IPOs because
in total 19 companies were outperforming, while only 8 companies showed
underperformance. Finding on average outperformance may also be caused by the fact
that we found on average small beta's. The latter is more often found for IPO-companies
from ex post measurements [Cotter, 1992], but it may make the calculated required rate
of return concomitantly small and this may induce at the same time the autonomous ai to
be positive. The standard deviation is -according to Table 4- relatively large and the worst
performing company showed underperformance on a daily basis of 0.093 percent, while
the best performer gained 0.228 percent autonomous growth a day during a period of
three years.
We made OLS estimates of the relationship between the autonomous growth term and the
magnitude of the separate companies (in sales and in number of employees), but we did
not find any significant relationship. We also searched for relations between long term
performance and the background of the company. We used a background as a family firm
and a background as a venture capitalists firm in the chi-square test from a cross
tabulation procedure with either under- or outperformance. Neither background variable
proved to be significant. Finally, neither the background variables nor a distinction
between small and large companies showed significant chi-squares with a change in the
organizational variables under study.
In order to learn whether the autonomous daily growth depended on any of the
IPO-related changes of Table 3, we studied the relationships between the value of the
autonomous growth component ai and these changes. We first tested on normality of the
alfa's amongst the 27 companies studied. The Lilliefors [1967] test gave a D-value of
0.139, implying that the H0 assumption that ai is normally distributed cannot be refuted.
We then considered the average value of ai among companies where an organizational
aspect changed and the average value of that autonomous component if the aspect did not
change according to the corporate officers. We used the t-tests for testing the equality of
these means. Before proceeding with these calculations, we first used the Levene test for
equality of variances. If Levene's test did not indicate differences in variances (at a 10%12
significance level), we used the t-test for equal variances, but if it indicated different
variances we used the t-test for different variances. The  resulting t-values and the
significance of the differences between the calculated means is also shown in table 5.
Table 5  The relation between a  change in organizational aspects and
performance (daily returns *100%)
Average value of the
autonomous component






Innovation 0.115 0.042  1.752    (0.094)**
Client orientation 0.053 0.061 -0.208    (0.838)
Alertness in the market 0.031 0.081 -1.394    (0.178)
Effectiveness and efficiency 0.065 0.024  0.600
a   (0.555)
Planning and control of company
results
0.061 0.024  1.010     (0.324)
Carefulness in capital budgeting 0.071 0.041  0.834     (0.413)
Clarity on what is relevant for
settling
0.079 0.042  1.067     (0.297)
Achievement- and task-oriented
leadership
0.069 0.044  0.745     (0.464)
Openness of internal
Communications
0.064 0.054  0.268
a   (0.792)
Decentralized decisions 0.075 0.040  0.838     (0.411)
Average 0.068 0.045  2.196
b     (0.056)**
a: variances differ according to the Levene's test
b: t-value of a matched-pairs test over the 10 aspects
** indicates significance at a 10% level.13
The first column of table 5 indicates the IPO-related changes mentioned by the
interviewed officers and presented in Table 3. The second column shows the average
value of the autonomous growth component (ai) of the market equation (1) in companies
in which the concomitant organizational aspect changed because of the IPO. The third
column shows the average value of that autonomous growth component if that aspect did
not change according to the interviewed officers. The fourth column presents t-values for
the differences in averages between column two and three as well as the significance
level of that difference.
Table 5 shows that a reported change in innovation improves on average the autonomous
performance of the companies significantly. The other organizational aspects do not show
significant differences in average autonomous performance between companies where the
IPO-related change was found and the companies where it was not found. The negative
relations between the aspects of client orientation and alertness in the  market are
unexpected: IPO-induced ‘wake-up calls’ on these organizational aspects may be rather
late. The negative evaluation in the stock market of these aspects may indicate that the
client and market consequences of the listing are unexpected and create additional costs.
Table 5 also shows that relative large, but insignificant, positive differences were
in particular found if the IPO induced changes in effectiveness and efficiency, in planning
and control of company results, in  capital budgeting, in clarity on settling and in
decentralized decision making.
By averaging the average autonomous components of the ten organizational
aspects we found a value of 0.068% on a daily basis with companies where the IPO-
related changes were found, while the concomitant average was only 0.045% for
companies in which these changes were not reported. Therefore the ten changing aspects
induced on average a positive effect of 0.023. A matched pairs t-test indicated a t-value of
2.196, representing a two-tailed significance of 0.056. From this we conclude that
companies with IPO-related changes on average show higher autonomous growth and
that they are more likely to be outperformers.14
6. Summary and conclusions
Long-term performance of IPOs may have many causes of which some are
documented in the literature. The possibility that an IPO itself may cause the company to
change is, however, neglected and no information is available on what changes can be
expected. In this article we present the results of a survey on IPO-related organizational
change amongst 27  corporate officers of companies that received a listing at the
Amsterdam Stock Exchange during 1987-1997. The interview method used is apt for
countries with a small number of companies listed and when non-financial variables are
relevant in explaining performance.
On four organizational aspects the respondents mentioned more than 50% of the
time a change. These most relevant IPO-related changes are related to financial
management and to financial  reporting as they comprise changes in effectiveness and
efficiency, planning and control,  capital budgeting and internal communications (on
company performance). Companies where the respondents reported changes in these
organizational variables showed an above average long-term performance, but the
relationships were not significant. In companies where the IPO induced innovation, the
long-term performance, however, increased significantly. Moreover, the performance of
companies was on average significantly higher in those companies where the respondents
reported changes on the 10 aspects
The first conclusion of this paper is that much IPO-literature is focussed on
underperformance, while the real issue is that of long-term performance. Long-term
performance is not only based on company products, markets and financing, but
originates also from within the company. This research finds that an IPO (or the
preparation for an IPO) can cause changes within a company. These IPO-related changes
are not necessarily financial but they can contribute positively to long-term performance.
This conclusion conveys a recommendation to officers of companies that hope to go
public. As the IPO is a major event in the development of a company, it may be used to
create preferred organizational change.15
Our study, secondly, shows that the corporate officers from The Netherlands
stress financial management related change, though other IPO-related changes are
relevant too. The IPO-related organizational changes in general prove to be significant
long-term value drivers in The Netherlands. Our conclusion is therefore that realized
organizational change can be a relevant post-IPO value driver.
Thirdly, many company characteristics -like magnitude and background- can be
observed before the IPO-date but they did not correlate significantly with long-term
performance. If this observation would hold for all ex-ante known company
characteristics, the IPO-market may be more efficient than mainstream empirical research
implies when observing long-term underperformance. A company that does not generate
organizational change will show underperformance and it is possible that the majority of
companies are relatively unaffected by the IPO. If the IPO, however, generates change
within the company, investors may notice improvements over time and they may then
reward the company with relatively large increases in share prices.
As our paper is -to the best of our knowledge- the first to study IPO-related
organizational changes, we do not expect to have been able to present all the potential
interesting effects of IPO-related organizational change. Moreover, the population
researched and the effects found are relatively small. Therefore, we hope to welcome
further studies from various industries and countries on this aspect.16
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